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Are Threats Made on Social Media a True Threats
Exception to the First Amendment?
BY ELANA HERZOG / ON SEPTEMBER 15, 2015

As the popularity of social media continues to grow, people are increasingly using it to
express themselves. While expressing oneself on social media sites is a documented right as
per the First Amendment, what is less clear is whether threats made on social media are
permitted under the First Amendment, or whether they constitute the “true threats” exception
that serves as a limitation on First Amendment rights. Put differently, at what point are threats
made on Facebook no longer a rant, but a true threat that is not covered by one’s First
Amendment rights?
In a recent major Supreme Court case, Elonis v. United States, Anthony Elonis posted various
items on his Facebook page that sounded like threats about injuring his “estranged wife,
police officers, a kindergarten class, and an FBI agent.” He argued that they were just rap lyrics
that he “intended as artistic and fictional.” He claimed to be using rap as a “‘therapeutic’
medium” through which to vent his frustrations.
In all of the cases leading up to Elonis v. United States, many legal experts said that true-threat
cases have failed to provide clear guidance, as there has been much disagreement among
lower courts. However, as a New York Times article indicates, in Elonis v. United States, the
Supreme Court had the opportunity to clarify whether the “true threats” exception to the First
Amendment applies to threats made on Facebook, Internet and social media.
The key question for the Court to decide was how to instruct the jury. Should the jury be told
that Elonis was guilty only if he had the purpose of putting the alleged targets in fear of
criminal attack – the required mens rea? Or should the jury be told that Elonis was guilty so
long as “a reasonable person would foresee” that the targets would perceive the statement as
seriously expressing an intent to criminally attack them (a “negligence test”)? Each of these
questions focuses on what level of mental culpability, or “mens rea,” is required to justify
criminal punishment.
To figure this out, the Court had to interpret two bodies of law. First, it had to decide what
mental state is required by the federal threats statute, 18 U.S.C. §875, which bans transmitting
“in interstate or foreign commerce” (which includes the Internet, telephones, the mail, and
many other means) “any communication containing any threat to kidnap [or injure].” Second,
it had to decide what mental state is required by the “true threats” exception to the First
Amendment, since it’s only the existence of this exception that makes the federal threats
statute constitutional. And, as in all such situations, the criminal defendant would get the
benefit of the higher mental state (the one more demanding on the government).

The federal trial court in this case concluded that the “reasonable person” negligence test was
sufficient both under the federal statute and under the First Amendment true threats
exception. The court of appeals agreed, as have most other circuit courts of appeals. But the
Ninth and the Tenth Circuit courts of appeals concluded that, under the First Amendment,
speech can’t be punished as a true threat unless it’s said with the purpose to put in fear, and
that therefore the federal threat statute must be interpreted the same way (as must any other
state or federal threat statutes, if they are to be constitutional). The Supreme Court agreed to
hear the case, largely to resolve this disagreement among lower courts.
The Supreme Court decided that the federal threats statute would be satisfied by a showing
that the speaker had the purpose of putting the target in fear (mens rea), or that he knew the
target would be put in fear (the “knowledge test”) — the defendant’s counsel had conceded
at oral argument that such knowledge would indeed satisfy the federal statute.
The Court decided that the federal threats statute would not be satisfied by a mere showing
that a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would put the target in fear (the
Court thus rejected the negligence test).
The Court expressly declined to reach the First Amendment question, because their ruling led
to the conviction being reversed on statutory grounds (though there would likely be a retrial,
if the prosecution so wishes). “Given our disposition,” the Court said, “it is not necessary to
consider any First Amendment issues.”
Justice Thomas, who would have upheld Mr. Elonis’s conviction, said the majority’s approach
was unsatisfactory. “This failure to decide,” he wrote, “throws everyone from appellate judges
to everyday Facebook users into a state of uncertainty.”
But isn’t the Supreme Court’s decision not to rule on First Amendment issues a veneer of
sorts? Is it really possible to draw the line between the federal threats statute and the true
threats exception to the First Amendment when the consequences are identical? Granted, the
Supreme Court required either a purpose to threaten or actual knowledge that the target of
the threat will feel threatened in order for it to be criminalized under the federal threat
statute, but aren’t they by default ruling on the “true threats” exception of the First
Amendment? By not criminalizing Elonis, they are in effect allowing social media threats to be
made even if a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would put the target in
fear as per their First Amendment rights. Moreover, it is only because of the true threats
exception to the First Amendment that the federal threat statute is constitutional altogether!
Whether or not the poster of the threat would be criminalized under the First Amendment
true threats exception if they did indeed have the purpose to put the target in fear remains
unclear, however, what is crystal clear is that a poster of a threat which a reasonable person
would foresee as putting the target in fear does NOT fall within the true threats exception of

the First Amendment, and remains covered under one’s First Amendment rights. Even the
Supreme Court of the United States cannot disguise that.
Elonis v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 200 (2015).
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